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We propose a funding scheme for theoretical research that does not rely on project proposals,
but on recent past scientific productivity. Given a quantitative figure of merit on the latter and the
total research budget, we introduce a number of policies to decide the allocation of funds in each
grant call. Under some assumptions on scientific productivity, some of such policies are shown to
converge, in the limit of many grant calls, to a funding configuration that is close to the maximum
total productivity of the whole scientific community. We present numerical simulations showing
evidence that these schemes would also perform well in the presence of statistical noise in the scien-
tific productivity and/or its evaluation. Finally, we prove that one of our policies cannot be cheated
by individual research units. Our work must be understood as a first step towards a mathematical
theory of the research activity.
I. INTRODUCTION
The introduction of performance-based funding at the end of the twentieth century, both at the level of
institutions and single researchers, has had a significant impact on the current organization of the academic
world. At the institutional level, research evaluation practices with the goal of distributing public funding
have been introduced in several countries [1]. At the same time, universities and research institutions
rely more and more on grants to pay salaries, which are obtained by single researchers or consortia via
a competitive procedure, in parallel to an increase of the percentage of non-permanent positions and
competition among scientists [2–5]. The goal of these policies is to improve the performance of the research
system, e.g., at a national or European level. On the one hand, these policies are supposed to move funds
from the “less efficient” to the “more efficient” institutions and researchers, thus optimizing the fund
allocation; on the other hand, the competition among researchers is supposed to drive their productivity.
At present, most research policies rely on the unfortunate idea that there is just one way of conducting
science. In fact, there are two: experiments and theory, and science cannot advance without either. Theo-
retical researchers propose mathematical models to predict the outcomes of future experiments; and their
experimental counterparts test the validity of such models in the lab. The programs currently used by
grant agencies to promote research seem to be solely conceived with experimental science in mind. Not
surprisingly, they are quite unfit for grant applicants from the theoretical sciences, such as mathematicians,
computer scientists and theoretical physicists.
Let us explain why. In order to apply for a grant, most funding agencies demand a research project, i.e.,
they require scientists to detail their research activities within a period of 2 to 5 years in the future. While
this scheme reflects the way many experimentalists organize their research agenda, it is incompatible with
the current practice of theoretical research. One cannot “plan” discovering mathematical calculus, quantum
cryptography or neural networks. Quite the opposite, some of the most celebrated ideas in history have
arisen during the course of an unrelated investigation (see, e.g., [6] for a few examples). It is by following
these new threads that theorists keep their scientific productivity. On the contrary, stubbornly sticking to
a single research line no matter what is a sound predictor of scientific sterility.
Agencies also demand theorists to lay out their “methodology”. Namely, they expect theorists to explain
how they intend to prove this or that theorem. The honest answer is that they dont know. If they did, the
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2theorem would be proven already, and they would not be applying for funds to crack it.
For the working theorist, applying for research funds is therefore a long and unethical task. It involves
concocting an elaborate fantasy where the theorist pretends to know what theorems he/she will be proving
in the next few years and through which particular mental processes. This activity, not clearly correlated
with the applicant’s success, takes a lot of time away from research [7]. The product of these efforts, the
project proposal, has no value whatsoever for society, and yet it is kept secret on the grounds of avoiding
plagiarism. This lack of transparency makes grant panels unaccountable of any decision they make.
Let us stress that the current grant system pushes theorists to lie in order to get funded. Indeed, if
theorists carry their research sensibly, there will invariably be a mismatch between the original goals of
the project and the final research output. So far no major scandal has transpired because the evaluators
of a grant’s final reports are researchers themselves: acknowledging that the system is flawed, they almost
always award a positive assessment. This state of affairs, though, could change from one day to another,
making thousands of theoretical researchers liable to a civil suit for fraud. In this direction, Gillies docu-
ments grant rules which advocate for the punishment of researchers who do not achieve the project goals
[6]. E.g.: forbidding them to apply again for the next two years, or reporting them to the head of their
research institution.
We have reached this situation because, up to now, research policies have been based more on political
fashion than on solid science. To progress beyond this point, we need an open scientific debate on research
funding practices, where the scientific method is applied to the problem, i.e., with hypothesis, models, and
experiments [8]. The problem of research funding can be roughly divided into two sub-problems: first, the
identification of the best evaluation method and corresponding parameters, e.g., of productivity or impact,
and then the problem of maximization of such parameters given the available financial resources.
Regarding the first problem, for the reasons above we believe that, at least for theoretical sciences,
agencies and institutions should focus on funding people rather than projects [9]. That is, the evaluation
of a researcher should be based on past scientific merits, as opposed to megalomaniac delusions.
The gross of the present paper addresses the second problem. Namely, presuming the existence of a
quantitative measure of research productivity, estimated through the analysis of recent scientific activity,
we investigate practical methods to optimize the total production of a global research system.
We start by modeling the research system as a collection of agents or research units. A research unit
can represent an individual scientist, a research group or a whole research institute. Each research unit
possesses a “scientific productivity function” that relates how much science a given research unit can
produce with the funds it holds to conduct research. We allow productivity functions to be probabilistic
and time-dependent. They are also unknown, i.e., neither the research agency nor the scientists themselves
can tell how they look like.
Relying on our mathematical model of the research activity, we show that there exist systematic proce-
dures to decide the budget distribution at each grant call with the property that the total productivity of
the research community will be frequently not far off its maximum value.
The simplest of such procedures is what we call the rule of three, by which the funds xk+1i for research
unit i after grant call k + 1 are proportional to the research output gki of the unit during the k
th term. If the
total budget for science during the (k + 1)th term is X euros, this means that
xk+1i = X
gki
∑j gkj
. (1)
The returns of this policy must be contrasted with those of “excellence” schemes, whereby, under equal
3research outcomes, researchers which were funded in the past have a greater chance of receiving further
funds. Such policies can be shown to converge to configurations where the total scientific productivity is
an arbitrarily small fraction of the maximum achievable by the research system. They are therefore better
to be avoided.
We also study to what extent research policies can be cheated by dishonest research units. We conclude,
for example, that hacks of the rule of three would require either influencing the evaluation stage or a
coalition of research units. They are hence unlikely.
An important aspect of the current funding system is the fact that the increased competition and insta-
bility generate pressure among researchers, the so-called publish or perish culture, with possible negative
consequences discussed in the literature, such as the focus on popular topics, short-term goals, and con-
servative research [6, 10, 11] and the proliferation of useless research or even dishonest practices [12–15].
The new funding framework that we advocate for is probably not a solution to the above problems,
which are also closely connected to evaluation practices. Our framework, however, does not force theorists
to engage in unethical practices, it is transparent and does not require the applicant to waste months of
working time in writing project proposals. In addition, our mathematical analysis of scientific populations
suggests that our grant schemes are relatively free from the so-called Matthew effect (i.e., “the rich get
richer and the poor get poorer.”) [16].
The paper is organized as follows. In Sect. II, we will introduce and motivate the use of a funding
scheme not based on project proposals, but rather on the evaluation of recent-past productivity of single
scientists or research institutions. In Sect. III, we will discuss which mathematical properties an idealized
productivity function should possess. In Sect. IV we will define mathematically the problem of maximizing
the total productivity of the system, given constraints on the total funding, and discuss possible ways of
solving it, assuming the knowledge of all the parameters of the problem. In Sections V, VI we will adapt
the previous analysis to the more realistic case of unknown model parameters, and explain how to extract
a funding policy in this situation. In particular, we will perform numerical simulations to compare the
performance of the different funding schemes under noise. In Sect. VII we will analyze the security
of one of our policies against dishonest players. In Sect. VIII, we will discuss possible extension of the
model to handle more complex situations, e.g., competing funding agencies. Finally, we will present our
conclusions.
II. FUNDING POLICIES NOT BASED ON RESEARCH PROJECTS
The purpose of public research agencies is to help scientists generate useful knowledge, and the problem
they face in each grant call is how to make sure that their funding reaches those in a position to generate
such knowledge. Most funding agencies assign grants with a competitive process based on a peer-review
evaluation of research proposals. As we argued at the introduction, this approach is not suitable for
theoretical sciences because theorists cannot predict their future work activity.
A more appropriate indicator of the quality of future theoretical research is the recent past performance
of the grant candidate. This motivates an alternative grant scheme for theoretical sciences based on the
principle that, if candidates have recently shown a remarkable scientific productivity, it is worth funding
them for the next few years so that they keep doing their good work. But what does “good work” mean?
There are many ways to quantify scientific productivity, and deciding which one suits best reflects a po-
litical stance. All such approaches fall in one of two main categories, namely, those based on bibliometrics
and those based on peer-review. Bibliometric data has the advantage of being easy and cheap to obtain,
e.g., through online databases containing publications and citations data, hence, it is often preferred by
4managers and administrators. However, there has been a proliferation of bibliometric indicators of scien-
tific productivity and impact [17, 18], often without a clear understanding of their pros and cons, from the
perspective of evaluation and decision making. It has being argued that many of these indicators reflect
“what can be easily counted, rather than what really counts”[18].
From the point of view of researchers, some methods may be considered fairer, such as expert assessment
of the most important recent papers of the candidate. However, peer-review may be impractical in terms
of cost and time, and even be partially flawed (see, e.g., [19, 20] and references therein) showing, for
instance, low reliability in the evaluations [21] or low ratings for highly novel ideas [22]. Several authors
have investigated whether peer-review and bibliometrics can be used together and how much they agree
[23–25]. Bollen et al. go further and propose an alternative funding scheme whereby the evaluation is
conducted by the whole scientific community [26, 27].
In summary, notwithstanding the growing interest in the problem of research evaluation and the impor-
tant results achieved so far, we feel that there is no general agreement on what the best evaluation methods
are. As a consequence, we will leave this problem open and just start from the assumption of the existence
of an abstract indicator of “scientific productivity”.
Once a measurable figure of scientific productivity is established, the question is how to decide how
much funds each research unit should receive. This is the problem we tackle in the rest of this paper.
Curiously enough, we find that, given an agreed measure of scientific productivity, reaching an optimal
allocation of research funds is not a political problem, but a mathematical one. In fact, we will show that
under ideal conditions there exists a systematic procedure to decide the budget distribution at each grant
call with the property that the total productivity of the research community will be frequently close to its
optimal value.
At this point, it is important to remark which problems we are not addressing in our work and what
possible use we can recommend or discourage. First, given the possible negative consequences of the
publish-or-perish culture and the attitude towards experimenting with research policies, discussed in the
previous section, we believe only a fraction of the entire research budget, e.g., at a national level, should
be assigned through competitive grants. It is still an open question how much competition is desirable in
academia, see, e.g., the discussion in Ref. [28] and references therein. Second, we leave open the question
of at which level the evaluation and funding distribution should be applied. We will speak, generically,
of “research units”. Each research unit could be a single scientist, a research group, a department, a
small research institution, or a university. We will occasionally speak of “a scientist” to provide examples
and motivations for our assumptions, but the results of our work are independent of this choice. Third,
we would like to remark that the methods and computational tools presented in this work are intended
to aid human decisions. We do not advocate for a scenario where scientists are constantly evaluated
by an algorithm that decides and directly modifies their salary. Finally, it is important to remark that
political decisions are sometimes disguised as technical or scientific ones, e.g., budget cuts for universities
and research institutions may be justified as technical decisions for the optimal use of available financial
resources. The distinction between technical and political decisions should be made as clear as possible.
We hope that separating the problem of funding from that of evaluation may bring clarity to the political
debate.
III. SCIENTIFIC PRODUCTIVITY FUNCTIONS: DEFINITION AND PROPERTIES
Consider an idealized scenario where there is just one grant agency administering all public funds
for research, and N “players” (using a game-theoretic terminology) or research units apply for funding
5in consecutive grant calls. For further simplicity, we will adopt first a simple model where each player
i = 1, ..., N has a time-independent productivity function gi. That is: if we award a player x euros and
demand it to use these funds within a time span T, then the scientific productivity of this player after time
T, however we measure it, will be gi(x). Moreover, this quantity will be the same, independently of when
we awarded the player the research funds. In Sect. VI, we will present a generalization to probabilistic and
time-dependent productivity functions.
We have three main assumptions about the productivity functions gi, which we will further discuss and
motivate in the following. Namely,
(a) gi(0) = 0, i.e., the productivity is zero when the budget is zero;
(b) gi is non-decreasing, i.e., if we increase the budget we should not decrease the productivity;
(c) gi is concave, i.e., the slope of the function is not increasing.
An example of a productivity function satisfying (a)-(c) is presented in Fig. 1.
Assumption (a) is quite straightforward: we do not expect a scientist without a salary to produce any
science. There are indeed examples of outstanding individuals, such as Einstein, Bose or Gosset (Student),
who carried out important theoretical contributions while working outside the academic world. However,
all those individuals had also a salary, i.e., they had a monthly money input x to play with.
For assumption (b), we expect that if the player behaves rationally, the productivity function should not
decrease with x. Indeed, suppose for example that g(x0) > g(x), for x > x0, see Fig 2. Then the player
awarded with x > x0 could simply spend x− x0 euros to organize a conference and use the remaining x0
euros to fund its research. Effectively, the player would then be operating according to a new increasing
productivity function g˜(x), with the property g˜(x) ≥ g(x) for all x.
FIG. 1. Expected productivity gi of a research unit as a function of its budget x. This picture illustrate the three main
assumptions: the function is zero for zero budget, it is non-decreasing, and it is concave.
6Similarly, one can argue that any productivity function must be approximately concave, i.e., assumption
(c). For suppose that, on the contrary, the increasing function g(x) is convex in the region [x0, x1], see Fig
2. Fix x′0 ≤ x′1 and consider the following research strategy: if the funding x satisfies x 6∈ [x′0, x′1], then the
scientist conducts research as usual, i.e., it will produce an output g(x). If, on the contrary, x ∈ [x′0, x′1],
then there exists a number 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 such that x = λx′0 + (1− λ)x′1. In this case, we require the scientist
to spend x′0λ euros for a fraction λ of the total duration of the grant; and x′1(1− λ), for the remaining
time 1− λ. Assuming that, under a constant monthly salary, scientific productivity is time independent
(namely, a scientist working for 2t months will produce twice as much as the same scientist working for
t months under the same salary), the total productivity will be λg(x′0) + (1− λ)g(x′1). As shown in Fig
2, one can choose x′0 ≤ x0, x′1 ≥ x1 such that the new effective productivity function g˜(x) the scientist is
operating under is concave. Moreover, g˜(x) ≥ g(x) for all x ≥ 0.
The only problem with the above argument is that scientific productivity is just approximately linear
with time. Indeed, one cannot expect 1000 postdocs to advance significantly a new research line if they
just have one day to do so (and we are overlooking the fact that very few would accept being employed for
such a short time!). Hence, if x′0 and x′1 are very distant and x  x′1, the previous scheme is not realistic.
In the following, though, we will assume for simplicity that the individual productivity is a concave
function. This may not be very accurate to model the activity of a single scientist, but should be a good
approximation to assess the productivity of a large group or a whole research institute. In sum, the shape
of function gi(x) is expected to be approximately of the form depicted in Fig 1.
Note that, from the conditions of concavity and gi(0) = 0, it follows that
gi(x)
x
≥ g′i(x), (2)
FIG. 2. The productivity of a research unit as a function of the funding x. As a function of x, the scientific productivity
g of a rational player cannot have: (a) decreasing regions; or (b) convex regions. In both cases, using the same budget,
the research unit can switch to a more favorable productivity function (dashed line) that is increasing and concave.
7for x ≥ 0. Indeed, compute a first-order Taylor expansion of gi(0) on x. That gives us
0 = gi(0) = gi(x)− xg′i(x) +
g′′i (c)x
2
2
, (3)
for some c ∈ [0, x]. Since gi(x) is concave, its second derivative is smaller than or equal to zero [29]. It
follows that the right hand side of the above equation is upper bounded by gi(x)− xg′i(x). Eq. (2) will
be extensively used throughout the paper. If the inequality in (2) is strict for x > 0, we will say that the
function gi(x) is curved at the origin. Intuitively, this means that, for any a > 0, the productivity function
gi(x) is not a straight segment from x = 0 to x = a.
A family of productivity functions satisfying all these properties and rich enough to model interesting
grant scenarios is the one given by “power functions” of the form g(x) = Axα, where A > 0, α ∈ (0, 1). This
family was already considered in [30], where an attempt was made to estimate the average productivity
function of a group leader. Moreover, the same power function, with an exponent smaller than (but close
to) 1, was obtained by analyzing total citation counts (across 26 scientific disciplines) versus funds (Higher
Education expenditure on Research & Development expressed in Purchase Parity Power dollars) for OECD
countries [31].
IV. THE PROBLEM OF FUND ALLOCATION
Let X be the total funding that the agency can award in a given grant call. The goal of the funding
agency is to identify the distribution of funds that maximizes the research output, given upper and lower
bounds of the form X−i ≤ xi ≤ X+i on each player’s budget xi. The upper bounds stem from both the
unwillingness of the individual to coordinate a large research group/institution and/or the desire of the
funding agency of not concentrating a large amount of research funds in the hands of a few players.
The lower bounds {X−i }i could correspond to negotiated minimum budgets for each research institute or
public servant. Through the rest of the paper, the set of constraints
∑
j
xj = X,
X−i ≤ xi ≤ X+i , for i = 1, ..., N (4)
will be denoted the funding conditions. In case X−i = 0, X
+
i = ∞, for i = 1, ..., N, i.e., in case the only
restriction of the individual budgets is that they are non-negative, we will speak of free funding conditions.
In case X−i = 0, we will speak of capped funding conditions.
Ultimately, any funding agency wants to solve the optimization problem:
g?(X) ≡ maximize
N
∑
i=1
gi(xi),
such that
N
∑
i=1
xi = X,
X−j ≤ xj ≤ X+j , j = 1, ..., N. (5)
8Since the funding conditions define a convex set and the objective function ∑Ni=1 gi(xi) is concave, any
local maximum of ∑Ni=1 gi(xi) is also a global maximum. In other words: independently of our current
budget configuration {x0i }, one can always identify the direction towards the optimal productivity by
exploring how the objective function grows locally. It is also easy to prove that, as a function of the total
funding X, g?(X) is also concave.
For free funding conditions and fully homogeneous productivity functions, i.e., gi = g1 for i = 2, ..., N,
the best strategy turns out to be distributing the funding equally among the researchers, in order to exploit
the greater initial gradient of their productivity functions. That is, the solution of the above problem is
Ng1
(
X
N
)
. If g1(x) admits a first derivative at x = 0, for N  1, the latter quantity tends to g′1(0)X.
Unfortunately, scientists can have very different productivity functions. Consider a scenario where each
scientist i has a power productivity function
gi(x) = Aixαi . (6)
In Appendix A it is shown that the maximal productivity of this scientific population is given by
g?(X) =∑
i
Ai(αi Aiµ(X))
αi
1−αi , (7)
where µ(X) is computed by solving the equation
∑
i
(αi Aiµ)
1
1−αi = X. (8)
Example
It is at this point instructive to try to apply this simple model to “real data”. Of course, this example is
only illustrative of certain peculiar properties of the productivity functions and of the funding model. For
instance, for simplicity, we will measure productivity simply by counting the number of papers, which is
clearly a terrible quantifier, which we do not endorse. Moreover, contrary to the method present in Sect. V,
the current example uses the assumption of the specific productivity function of Eq. (6), which is in general
not necessary. Finally, we do not claim that the numerical values obtained are particularly realistic, as they
are extracted from only two data points and we provide no statistical analysis. Let us first go through the
details of the example and, then, discuss at the end.
Since 1996, FWF Austrian Science Fund’s START program provides the successful applicant with a fund-
ing amount between 0.8 and 1.2 million euros, to be spent in six years [32]. The elegibility requirements
demand that the doctoral degree of applicants be completed no less than two years and no longer than
eight years before the deadline for submission of applications. It is thus not unreasonable to assume that
most successful candidates did not have any prior funding, other than their own postdoc salary, before
receiving the START grant. We randomly selected six START awardees, all of which work either in the-
oretical physics or mathematics, and estimated their scientific individual productivities by counting their
number of peer-reviewed published papers in the six years prior to the year of the award and also in the
9six next years. For each candidate i that provided us with two productivity points g1i , g
2
i for each candi-
date. Complemented with the two funding inputs x1i = 435, 780.00 euros (the salary of a Senior Postdoc
in Austria for six years) and x2i = 1, 200, 000.00 euros (the maximum START funding), we had enough
information to infer Ai, αi for each researcher.
Just for the matter of illustration, we have adopted the number of publications as a figure of merit.
Since all the considered researchers received their START grants between 2007 and 2011, one would expect
them to have been raised in the culture of “publish or perish”. It is therefore sensible that most of them
dedicated a substantial amount of effort to maximize their publication number.
The parameters of the so-computed productivity function for each researcher are displayed in the table
below:
i A α
1 0.1447 0.35212
2 0.0213 0.44621
3 4.9761 0.14333
4 0.1574 0.41840
5 0.0312 0.43619
6 0.0076 0.62321
TABLE I. Power productivity functions of a population of N = 6 scientists.
Note that all exponents α are between 0 and 1, in agreement with our assumption that productivity func-
tions are increasing and concave.
The total amount of funds destined to these six researchers was X = 6× 1.2 million euros. Since the
FWF distributed the funds equally among each researcher, the total productivity of this population due
to the START grant is ∑6i=1 gi(X/6) ≈ 184. Using eq. (7), however, we obtain a maximal productivity of
g?(X) ≈ 225. This is obtained by distributing budget X in the way shown in Fig 3.
If the aim of the START program is to maximize the number of publications, then the program is
just operating at 100 × 184/225 ≈ 81% of its optimal yield. This percentage decreases as we increase
the total funding X. Indeed, take X = 100 million euros. In that case, an equal redistribution of the
budget would produce an research output of 592 publications. In contrast, the optimal allocation of such
funds would give rise to g?(X) ≈ 886. The performance of the egalitarian fund allocation would thus be
100× 592/886 ≈ 67%. Of course, the aim of this example is to provide a simple illustration of our method,
rather than to criticise the egalitarian fund distribution.
What is fundamental to notice is that, despite the extreme and unrealistic simplification of the model in
this example, in particular the evaluation of “productivity” as a one-dimensional parameter, the player that
obtains most of the funding in Fig. 3 is not necessarily “the best researcher”. In fact, by changing the total
amount X available, one would change the optimal distribution of funds, hence, the (purported) induced
“ranking” among researchers. More specifically, researchers with αi  1 would receive most of the funds
for low values of X, e.g., because they excel at working alone or in small groups, while researchers with
αi ≈ 1 would claim the greatest portion of the science budget in the high X regime, e.g., because they
excel at directing large research groups. This goes against the (possibly commonly accepted idea) that
evaluation committees should choose, among a group of candidates for a grant, the one with the highest
scientific productivity, irrespectively of the available resources. This concludes our example.
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FIG. 3. Optimal distribution of START funds over the N = 6 researchers.
In alternative to the estimation of the function parameters, one can apply a very intuitive rule of thumb
to decide fund allocation. It consists of transferring funds between the different players until their average
productivity rates fi(xi) ≡ gi(xi)xi are as close as possible. That way, we arrive at a final distribution of funds
{x]i }i such that, for any i 6= j, i, j = 1, ..., N,
fi(x
]
i ) > f j(x
]
j ) implies that x
]
j = X
−
j or x
]
i = X
+
i . (9)
In principle, one can achieve such a configuration by solving the optimization problem:
maximize
N
∑
i=1
Gi(xi),
such that
N
∑
i=1
xi = X,
X−j ≤ xj ≤ X+j , j = 1, ..., N, (10)
where Gi(x) ≡
∫ x
0 dy
gi(y)
y . It can be easily proven that, for each i, Gi(x) is a concave function. This means
that the maximization (10), like (5), does not risk getting stuck in local maxima.
Define g](X) = ∑i gi(x
]
i ), where {x]i }i is the configuration of funds maximizing (10). Since {x]i }i 6=
{x?i }i, we expect that g](X) < g?(X), i.e., this manner of allocating funds will not be optimal in general.
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In this regard, consider a bipartite (N = 2) scientific population where, for x ∈ (0, 1] player 1 has an
almost constant productivity function g1(x) = 1 for x > 0, while player 2’s productivity function is linear,
i.e., g2(x) = x. Then the optimal funding configuration consists in assigning player 1 an infinitesimal
amount of funds (x?1 = δ), while giving player 2 the rest (x
?
2 = X − δ). The supremal (not maximal)
productivity is thus g?(X) = 1+ X. On the contrary, using the above rule of thumb, it is easy to see that,
for X < 1, x]1 = X, x
]
2 = 0, and so g
](X) = 1. As X gets close to 1, the fraction g](X)/g?(X) tends to 12 .
Not only we do not achieve the maximal productivity, but the funding distributions in one case and the
other are complete different!
Nonetheless, it is possible that, while not being optimal, g](X) is not that far off the optimal scientific
productivity. In this line, we have the following result.
Theorem 1. Consider a scientific population characterized by productivity functions {gi(x)}Ni=1, subject to capped
funding conditions {0 ≤ xj ≤ X+i ,∑i xi = X}. Then
g](X) ≥ 1
2
g?(X). (11)
In other words: even though the grant scheme (21) is suboptimal, its performance is, at worst, half of the
optimal one. Moreover, due to the example above, the constant 12 cannot be improved. See Appendix B for
a proof.
As shown in Appendix D 1, for free-funding conditions, and provided that the slope of each function
gi at x = 0 is “big enough” (more concretely: fi(0) > f j
(
X
N−1
)
for all i, j), we have that the optimal
configuration {x]i }i will satisfy
gi(x
]
i )
x]i
=
1
λ
, for all i, (12)
for some λ > 0.
Note that the slope condition holds for power productivity functions (since fi(0) = ∞ for all i). For
populations of research units described by such functions, we can thus use eq. (12) to derive an explicit
expression for g](X), namely:
g](X) =
X
λ(X)
, (13)
where λ(X) is obtained by solving the equation:
∑
i
(Aiλ)
1
1−αi = X. (14)
Applying formula (13) to the scientific population described in Table I of the example, with X = 6× 1.2
million euros, we obtain g](X) ≈ 213 publications. This represents an efficiency of 100× g](X)/g?(X) ≈
95%. For X = 100 million euros, we obtain g](X) ≈ 861, with an efficiency of 100× g](X)/g?(X) ≈ 97%.
This allocation scheme thus seems to give a good performance when applied to real scenarios.
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V. FUNDING POLICIES
Unfortunately, neither the funding agency nor the scientists themselves know the explicit form of their
productivity functions. So how can a funding agency expect to solve problem (5)?
In the following two sections, we provide a number of automated methods to carry out this task. Under
some assumptions on scientific production, some of these methods are guaranteed, on their own, to steer
the productivity of a scientific population near its maximum possible value.
Nonetheless, these computational tools are intended to be used by human agents as an aid to reach
a final budget decision. Note that the sole purpose of these tools is to maximize a given figure of merit,
irrespective of any other considerations. We strongly doubt that the whole scientific enterprise can be
reduced to an optimization problem. Thus, by removing human intervention completely from scientific
policy decision-making, we risk reaching a dystopian scenario where any aspect of science other than an
agreed objective function is viewed as an obstacle towards the maximization of the latter. On the other
hand, we know, from the world of chess, that in some situations the best decision-makers are neither
human nor artificial, but a team of both kinds of entities. We are therefore confident that funding agencies
will greatly benefit from the ideas that we present next.
We will start by dividing time in terms, of s years each. At the end of the kth term, the funding agency
announces the (k + 1)th call, and, after a proper evaluation, distributes the funds in such a way that player
i receives xk+1i euros to be spent on the (k + 1)
th term.
Now, let us forget for the time being that we ignore the objective function g(x¯) ≡ ∑Ni=1 gi(xi). A very
effective tool to solve maximization problems like (5) is the projected gradient method [33]. The output of
this method is a sequence of feasible budgets x¯1, x¯2, x¯3, ... with the property that
1
k
k
∑
j=1
g(x¯j) ≈ g(x¯?), (15)
with x¯? being the optimal configuration. Each budget x¯k+1 is obtained from the previous one x¯k by the
following iterative equation:
x¯k+1 = piB
(
x¯k + e∇¯g(x¯k)
)
, (16)
where e > 0 is a free parameter known as the learning rate and piB(z¯) denotes the closest vector y¯ to z¯ (in
Euclidean norm) belonging to the set B = {x¯ : x¯ ≥ 0, ∑Ni=1 xi = X, 0 ≤ xj ≤ Xj, ∀j} of allowed budget
configurations. Computing piB(z¯) = arg miny¯∈B ‖z¯− y¯‖2 can be cast as a semidefinite program [34], a type
of optimization problems which we know how to solve efficiently.
Now suppose that, at the (k+ 1)th call of the grant, we chose to distribute the funds according to x¯k+1 in
eq. (16), and that we repeated this operation in all subsequent calls. Since g(x¯) is (approx.) concave, by eq.
(15), very frequently the current budget distribution would (approx.) maximize the total scientific output
of the community.
Our problem is, however, that we don’t know ∇¯g(x). Consider then the following modification of the
iterative equation:
x¯k+1 = piB
(
x¯k + e∇˜kg
)
, (17)
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where we have approximated the gradient
∇¯g(x¯k) =
(
∂g1(xk1)
∂xk1
,
∂g2(xk2)
∂xk2
, ...,
∂gN(xkN)
∂xkN
)
(18)
by the vector
∇˜kg =
(
gk1 − gk−11
xk1 − xk−11
,
gk2 − gk−12
xk2 − xk−12
, ...,
gkN − gk−1N
xkN − xk−1N
)
, (19)
where gki is the declared scientific production of player i at the end of the k
th term (that should equal gi(xki ),
if the player is being honest, see Section VII).
One can show that the iteration scheme (17) also satisfies eq. (15), see Appendix E. Note, though, that the
vector component (∇˜kg)i can be computed given the funding xk−1i , xki received by the candidate in the last
two grant calls and the corresponding research outputs gk−1i , g
k
i . Hence this procedure can be implemented
in practice. By using eq. (17) to decide the budget distribution in the (k + 1)th term, we make sure that, in
the long run, research funds are distributed in an optimal way. Note that there may be situations where
we lack data to compute ∇˜kg(x), e.g.: the candidate just finished the PhD studies, or had a child-raising
break. In those cases, one can replace (∇˜kg)i by gˆixˆi , where gˆi, xˆi are, respectively, the last known scientific
production of the candidate and the science funds it was enjoying at the time.
The recursive method (17), that we will in the following refer to as the gradient scheme, is an instance of
a grant policy. There are others. Consider, for instance, the following one:
xk+1i = piB
(
xki + e
gki
xki
)
. (20)
This is none other than the gradient method, applied to solve optimization problem (10). For e small
enough, the orbit (x¯k)k will often be very close to the optimal configuration {x]i }i. Moreover, for capped
funding conditions, Theorem 1 guarantees that the corresponding total productivity will be, at least, one
half of the optimal one. Note that this scheme only requires knowledge of the total scientific budget X
and the immediate past performance of the players: it is a zero-order scheme, as opposed to the first-order
scheme (17), that requires information of the last two grant calls. We will dub this policy the average rates
scheme A.
Alternatively, one can use (for free funding conditions) the iterative method:
xk+1i = X
gki
∑Nj=1 g
k
j
. (21)
This is also a zero-order scheme, where we do not even need to know the funds {xki }i awarded to each
researcher at call k in order to decide the funding distribution of call k + 1.
Interestingly, if the initial distribution of funds {x0i } satisfies x0i > 0 for all i and all productivity functions
are curved at the origin, it can be proven that this policy converges exponentially fast to the configuration
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{x]i }i of Eq. (12) (see Appendix D for a proof). We will refer to this grant policy as the average rates scheme
B, or, more colloquially, as the rule of three, since, given xk+11 , g
k
1, any other player i = 2, ..., n can use g
k
i and
the rule of three to compute its future funding.
Finally, there is another grant policy, that we will hereby call the standard scheme, by which the funding
of each researcher is proportional to the funds it received in the previous grant call and its productivity.
That is:
xk+1i = piB
(
X
xki g
k
i
∑j xkj g
k
j
)
, (22)
where piB denotes, as before, the projection onto the set of budgets satisfying the funding conditions. The
standard scheme reflects the growing perception in the theoretical physics community that the probability
of being awarded a grant for a theoretical project grows with both the productivity of the candidate and
the funding obtained in the past. For an evidence, consider the following extract from the Application
Guidelines for Stand-Alone Projects, FWF Austria Science Fund: “Most important research projects funded
in the past (no more than 5). [...] For each project, please provide the following information: Project title, funding
agency, project duration (from/to) and amount of funding granted”.
Both the distribution of funds and the final total productivity of this scheme depend significantly on the
initial budget configuration x¯0. Indeed, consider free funding conditions, and assume that the productivity
functions are all identical and equal to the power function (6). Then one can show that the standard scheme
converges to a fund configuration where just the players i with maximum values of x0i receive any funds
whatsoever. For generic initial configurations x¯0, only one player i will satisfy this demand, in which case
the asymptotic total productivity of the standard scheme will be g[(X, x¯0) = AXα. This has to be compared
to the optimal productivity g?(X) = N1−αAXα, achieved by the “egalitarian” configuration xi = XN , for
i = 1, ..., N. In this example, the final configuration enforced by the standard scheme is thus maximally
unfair, with just one player holding all the resources, instead of an equal distribution of funds. In addition,
for large populations of scientists (N  1), the quotient g[(X,x¯0)g?(X) becomes arbitrarily small. This gives some
theoretical grounds for Nobel Laureate Jeffrey C. Hall’s remarks in [35]:
I can’t help feel that some of these [scientific] ‘stars’ have not really earned their status. I wonder
whether certain such anointees are ‘famous because they’re famous’. So what? Here’s what: they receive
massive amounts of support for their research, absorbing funds that might be better used by others.
VI. PROBABILISTIC TIME-DEPENDENT PRODUCTIVITY FUNCTIONS
In realistic scenarios, it is expected that a player’s productivity will not only depend on funding, but also
on a number of variables which escape our control (health, lack of sleep, love affairs...). We can model the
effect of these variables by postulating that productivity functions must be probabilistic. Actually, in the
real world things are even more complicated: productivity functions vary with time, as researchers acquire
new knowledge and skills, or their motivations waver. In these conditions formula (17) is not guaranteed
to generate orbits close to an optimal productivity.
Suppose then that gi is a probabilistic function that varies with time, i.e., the productivity of player i
at the end of term k is a random variable gki of the form g
k
i = gi(x, k). Then deciding which quantity
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to optimize in this scenario is again a political (subjective) matter. A reasonable figure of merit, that we
will use from now on, is the average scientific productivity at each term k. Note that one can repeat the
arguments in Section III to suggest that 〈gi(x, k)〉 should also be increasing and approximately concave in
x. Our goal is therefore to identify a policy to decide the fund allocation x¯j at each grant call j, such that,
for k 1,
1
k
k
∑
j=1
g(x¯j, j) ≈ 1
k
k
∑
j=1
max
x¯∈B
〈g(x¯, j)〉 (23)
with high probability.
This puts us in a conundrum. On one hand, a single estimate of gi(xi, t) does not allow us to assess
its average value, which we need to know in order to maximize the average productivity of the whole
community. On the other hand, we cannot rely on the early past history of the candidate, because the
productivity function also changes with time.
One possibility is to apply the gradient scheme (17), but with a correction that guarantees that random
fluctuations do not squander the optimum budget. Note that, using the grant policy (17), it could be
the case that a candidate receives the same funding twice consecutively, xki = x
k−1
i , but outputs different
results gi(xki ) 6= gi(xk−1i ). That would lead us to estimate an infinite gradient that would either put all the
future budget in the hands of this candidate, or reduce its budget to 0 in the present grant call. In such a
predicament, it is more convenient to use the corrected formula
zk+1i = x
k
i + eH(x
k
i , x
k−1
i , g
k
i , g
k−1
i ),
x¯k+1 = piB
(
z¯k+1
)
, (24)
where H(xki , x
k−1
i , g
k
i , g
k−1
i ) is a “filtered version” of (∇˜g)i, defined as:
H(xki , x
k−1
i , g
k
i , g
k−1
i ) =0, if (∇˜kg)i < 0,
gki
xki
, if (∇˜kg)i >
gki
xki
,
(∇˜kg)i, otherwise. (25)
The filter’s goal is to get rid of non-sensical estimations ∇˜kg of the actual gradient ∇¯kg of the objective
function. Indeed, since gi(x) is increasing, it can’t be that g′i(x) < 0. Similarly, by eq. (2), g
′
i(x) ≤ fi(x).
For g deterministic and time-independent, H(xki , x
k+1
i , g
k
i , g
k+1
i ) = ∇˜kg. The policy (24) is, in this sce-
nario, equivalent to algorithm (17), and so its outputs (x¯k)k will satisfy eq. (15). We leave as an open
question under which conditions eq. (23) is satisfied in the probabilistic, time-dependent case. For the rest
of the article, the use of formula (24) to decide the funding allocation will be dubbed the modified gradient
scheme.
Alternatively, we can resort to the average rates schemes (20), (21). Since these policies only take into
consideration productivity data and funds from the previous grant call, one would expect them to be even
more robust against the time evolution of the productivity function. Moreover, by inspection of eqs. (20),
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(21) it is clear that small random fluctuations on the productivity will hardly affect the resulting budget
configuration after a few calls. In fact, for the average rates scheme A, it can be proven (see Appendix F)
that, if the productivity functions change slowly with time, then with high probability we have
1
k
k
∑
j=1
g(x¯j, j) ≈ 1
k
k
∑
j=1
〈g(yj, j)〉. (26)
Here yj denotes x¯], as defined in (9), for the functions gi(x) ≡ 〈gi(x, j)〉. By Theorem 1, this means that,
under capped funding conditions, the average rates Scheme A is guaranteed to produce on average at least
half of the optimal productivity.
So far we have discussed three different grant policies. Which one shall we use in practice? To help us
answer that question, we will next compare their performance in a number of numerical simulations.
In each simulation, we will consider a population of researchers with time-independent, non-deterministic
productivity functions. Their average productivity functions will be given by Table I. To model both the
random fluctuations in productivity and the volatility of scientific evaluation, we assign to each scientist a
measure of unpredictability 0 ≤ U ≤ 1: the actual productivity of the scientist is taken to be gi(x)(1+ ui),
where ui is a random number chosen uniformly from the interval [−U, U]. In our simulations, we studied
three cases of interest: U = 0 (no noise), U = 1/8, (low noise) and U = 1/2 (high noise).
Starting with the random funding distribution x¯0 = (1.6804, 1.8683, 0.2619, 1.8839, 1.3043, 0.2012)× 106,
we estimated the fraction of the maximal productivity achieved via different policies at each call k. The
normalized average productivity is depicted in Fig 4, together with its variance. As we can see, even under
low statistical noise the rule of three performs slightly better than the modified gradient scheme after a
reasonable number of calls (5, 6), and substantially better than the standard scheme. In the asymptotic
limit, the performances of the average rates schemes A and B are comparable, but the latter converges
faster to the optimal value.
Which one of these policies should be chosen depends on the typical form productivity functions, a
matter that can only be decided through experiment. If the relevant productivities exhibit almost no
statistical noise, the modified gradient scheme shall be preferred. On the contrary, under free funding
conditions and a fair amount of noise, the rule of three seems to be the wisest choice.
VII. DISHONEST PLAYERS
So far we have been assuming that all players are honest, namely, that they won’t try to play the system
to obtain more funds than they should. Such is a very naive position: ideally, we would like to have
research policies which cannot be played. In this spirit, we will next study the security of the rule of three
against dishonest participants.
For simplicity, we will carry the analysis under the assumption that the dishonest player, Daniel, be-
longs to a large scientific population where the budget distribution is almost stationary (i.e., it is close
to an equilibrium). We will also assume that Daniel’s optimal productivity function is time-independent,
deterministic and curved at the origin. Finally, we will suppose that, if Daniel plays honestly, in the
asymptotic limit his budget x]i will be greater than zero.
Following eq. (21), by producing an amount of science gki at the end of the k
th term, Daniel will receive
the funds xk+1i = X
gki
∑j gkj
at the (k+ 1)th call. Since the population Daniel belongs to is large and its funding
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FIG. 4. Productivity as a function of the grant call k, for different scientific policies. The colors green, yellow, blue
and red denote, respectively, the modified gradient scheme, the average rates scheme A, the rule of three and the
standard scheme. Starting from a random distribution of funds, we study the performance of different policies under
increasing amounts of statistical noise. For both the modified gradient scheme and the average rates scheme A, we
chose e = 0.25∗Xmaxi(g0i /x0i )
. If each term lasts s = 4 years, then, in all cases, the rule of three would require 12 years to steer
the community to a configuration where the average scientific production is greater than 90% of the maximal value.
distribution close to stationarity, X
∑j gkj
will hardly vary with gki and k, so we will take it constant, i.e., we
will assume that xk+1i = λg
k
i , for some λ > 0.
Suppose that Daniel plays honest. Then, given an initial amount of funds x0i , he will invest them all on
research, thus producing g0i = gi(x
0
i ) and earning x
1
i = λgi(x
0
i ) at the end of the process. Iterating, we find
that the Daniel’s funds will follow the orbit x0i ,λgi(x
0
i ),λgi(λgi(x
0
i )),λgi(λgi(λgi(x
0
i ))), .... It can be shown
that, in the limit, he will be receiving x]i > 0 after each call, with x
]
i defined by the relation λgi(x
]
i ) = x
]
i .
In other words,
lim
k→∞
1
k + 1
k
∑
j=0
xji = x
]
i . (27)
Now, we let Daniel be dishonest. How could he get more than x]i on average? If the funding agency
requires each player to spend all his/her funds by the end of the term, then the only thing Daniel can
do is keep a fraction of his scientific results secret. Perhaps, by declaring a vast accumulation of scientific
achievements in one go he may manage, on average, to squeeze more money out of the grant agency.
More specifically: starting with the funds x0i and an amount of undeclared scientific results g
+
i , Daniel
would produce an output gi(x0i ). He could then declare, at the end of the term, that he has produced an
amount of results g0i , with 0 ≤ g0i ≤ g+i + gi(x0i ). In turn, the grant agency would reward him with an
amount x1i = λg
0
i , that he would use to produce gi(x
1
i ) results. In the next term, he would declare g
1
i , with
0 ≤ g1i ≤ g+i + gi(x0i )− g0i + gi(x1i ) results, and so on. Daniel’s declaration strategy is summarized in Table
II.
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term funds received reported productivity unreported productivity
0 x0i g
0
i g
+
i + gi(x
0
i )− g0i
1 x1i g
1
i g
+
i + gi(x
0
i )− g0i + gi(x1i )− g1i
2 x2i g
2
i g
+
i + gi(x
0
i )− g0i + gi(x1i )− g1i + gi(x2i )− g2i
...
...
...
...
TABLE II. Daniel’s cheating strategy.
The second column denotes the funds received at the beginning of the call. Columns 3 and 4 denote,
respectively, the reported and unreported scientific production when the funds run out. Note that, for
this table to represent a valid strategy, xk+1i = λg
k
i and the elements of column 4 must be greater than or
equal to 0. The question is whether Daniel can choose g1i , g
2
i , ... in such a way that, on average, he will
obtain more funds than acting honestly. That is, whether, for high k, 1k+1 ∑
k
j=0 x
j
i > x
]
i + δ, with δ > 0. In
Appendix G we show this not to be the case.
Thus, in the long run, Daniel will not win anything by delaying the publication of his scientific produc-
tion. On the contrary, by not publishing his results as soon as he produces them, he risks being scooped by
some other player, in which case he would be losing well-deserved science funds. It is therefore in Daniel’s
interest to play honest and declare all his productivity by the end of each term.
Note that this security analysis required assumptions on both Daniel’s productivity function (determin-
ism, time-independence and curvature at the origin) and the overall behavior of the scientific population. It
would be interesting to find out whether security also follows if such assumptions are dropped. Similarly,
it would be interesting to see if the modified gradient scheme and the average rates scheme A are also
secure under dishonest participants.
Most crucially, we have not studied the possibility that the evaluation of the scientific production of the
players is not impartial. Some studies suggest that for securying fund it is more important how researchers
build their collaboration network than what publications they produce and whether they are cited [36].
Actually, in some fields such a behavior has greatly influenced the distribution of research funds in the
past [37]. At the moment we do not have a solution for this problem, other than hoping that not so many
scientists engage in this practice.
VIII. DISCUSSION
Here we will examine some shortcomings of our model for research funding (5) and discuss how the
latter can be improved for its use in real-world scenarios. This section is much more technical than the
others and can be skipped on a first reading.
A. Assumptions on the productivity function
In section III, we argued that the productivity function gi(x) of each player i must be increasing and
approximately concave. We did so by reasoning that any rational player who knows the shape of its
productivity function can improve it piece by piece until it becomes increasing and approximately concave.
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The underlying assumptions are that the agent knows its productivity function, that it is interested in
maximizing it and that it acts rationally. These three conditions may not be met in practice.
Consider, for instance, the second one. Suppose that the goal of the funding agency were to maximize
the total number of publications, while the personal goal of player i is to maximize the quality of the said
publications. Then, given more funding, player i would not use it to increase its publication number, but
to hire better researchers and hence produce better papers. In such circumstances, there may not be a
simple relation between xi and the productivity gi measured by the agency. In principle, gi(x) could be
decreasing, or convex.
The maximization of non-concave functions is a conventional problem in artificial intelligence, where the
accuracy of the output of a neural network depends non-trivially on a number of continuous parameters.
There exist a number of methods to achieve this effect, see [38]. Unfortunately, all of them require a
reliable estimate of the gradient ∇¯kg. Under very low statistical fluctuations and productivity functions
independent of time, we can approximate ∇¯kg by ∇˜kg as in (17). In the general case, though, it is unclear
what to do when one of the components of ∇˜kg is negative or very high. Indeed, since gi may not be
neither increasing nor concave, we cannot assume that neither g′i(x) ≥ 0 nor eq. (2) holds, and so we are
not entitled to filter ∇˜kg as in eq. (25).
Another tacit assumption in (5) is that the productivity gi of a player i just depends on its funding xi (and
not on the funding {xj : j 6= i} of all the other players). This condition does not capture frequent real-world
situations where two or more research institutes compete for the same gifted group leader. A more realistic
model for scientific productivity would posit that there exists a global productivity function g(x1, ..., xN)
that does not necessarily decompose as a sum of independent productivities, i.e., g(x1, ..., xN) 6= ∑i gi(xi).
Funding agencies should therefore tackle the following optimization problem:
g?(X) ≡ maximize g(x1, ..., xN),
such that
N
∑
i=1
xi = X,
X−j ≤ xj ≤ X+j , j = 1, ..., N. (28)
Even under the assumption that g(x1, ..., xN) is concave, deterministic and stationary, a blind application
of the gradient method will soon lead to trouble. As before, the difficulty stems in estimating the gradient
of g(x1, ..., xN). One way to do so would be to keep the funding of all players but one constant and then
compute the difference between the two productivities. For high N this is clearly impractical: even in the
absence of statistical fluctuations, proximity to the optimal configuration of funds would only be achieved
after O(N) grant calls.
Finally, one could question whether productivity functions exist at all. In the most general case, the
productivity of a player at call k could also depend on his/her past success in securing grant funds, i.e.,
it could be a non-deterministic function, not only of xki , k, but also of x
1
i , ..., x
k−1
i . On the other hand, it
is possible that the much simpler model (5) already represents an accurate description of the scientific
practice. This question cannot be settled by pure mathematical reasoning, but through experimental work,
e.g., via pilot research programs.
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B. More than one funding agency
In real life there are several funding bodies at play. Depending on the goals of each funding body, there
are different optimization scenarios. If these bodies use the same measure of scientific productivity and
their goal is just to increase human knowledge, the best they can do is to create a common budget pool
and act as if they were a single funding entity. If they fund completely different areas of research, they can
use the policies above independently. If what these bodies fund is pretty much the same, and each of these
bodies seeks for recognition, then we enter a complicated game-theoretic problem. One can then divide
the funding xi of scientist i between its sources, i.e., ∑s xi,s = xi, and credit each funding agency t with
a proportional amount of the total productivity of each scientist, i.e., gi,t ≡ xi,t∑s xi,s gi(xi). The goal of each
funding agency t would be to maximize ∑Ni=1 gi,t, disregarding the performance of all the other agencies.
First of all, as a function of xi,s, it is immediate to see that gi,s satisfies gi,s(0) = 0. One can also prove
easily that it is also an increasing function of xi,s, since
∂gi,s
∂xi,s
=
gi(xi)
xi
− xi,t
x2i
(gi(xi)− g′i(xi)xi) ≥
g′i(xi)
xi
≥ 0. (29)
Here the last inequality follows from eq. (2) and xi ≥ xi,s.
In addition, assuming g′′′i (x) ≥ 0 for all x (this is the case, e.g., for the power functions (6)), one can
prove that gi,s is also concave. Indeed, note that
x2i
∂2gi,s
∂x2i,s
=
xi,s
xi
(
2gi(xi)− 2g′i(xi)xi + g′′i (xi)x2i
)
− 2gi(xi) + 2g′(xi)xi. (30)
Define h(z) ≡ 2gi(z)− 2g′i(z)z + g′′i (z)z2. It can be verified that h(0) = 0 and h′(z) = z2g′′′i (z) ≥ 0. Hence
the term between brackets on the right hand side of eq. (30) is non-negative for xi ≥ 0. Since xi,sxi ≤ 1, we
thus have that the right hand side of eq. (30) is upper bounded by g′′i (xi)x
2
i ≤ 0.
Since, as a function of xi,s, {gi,s}i is concave, the problem of maximizing ∑Ni=1 gi,t for fixed values of
{xi,t : t 6= s}i is a convex problem. Moreover, {gi,s}i also vanishes at zero, and is increasing, so agency s
can apply the grant policy (17) to find an orbit of configurations close to the optimal value. The conditions
of Theorem 1 are also met, and so (under capped funding conditions) agency s can similarly use the grant
schemes (20), (21) to approximate this maximum.
All this under the assumption, of course, that the other agencies t 6= s meanwhile keep their budget
configurations fixed. If all agencies tried to maximize their total credited productivity at the same time, the
system would converge towards a Nash equilibrium, where, of course, ∑s ∑
N
i=1 gi,s would not in general
coincide with the maximum total productivity achievable. Note that these conclusions also hold when
the productivity functions used by the agencies differ, i.e., when the (raw) productivity of scientist i is
evaluated differently by each agency.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a family of schemes to fund theoretical research. Contrary to the rule in
academic funding, these schemes do not rely on a project proposal, but on recent academic performance, as
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quantified by a given figure of merit. We observed that, once the figure of merit is accepted, the distribution
of grant funds becomes an academic problem as opposed to a political issue.
In this regard, we proposed an algorithm to decide the allocation of funds on each grant call. Under
certain idealized assumptions, the algorithm is guaranteed to drive the system, via successive grant calls, to
budget distributions maximizing the total scientific productivity. We also introduced alternative schemes,
based on the notion of average rates, to tackle scenarios with high statistical fluctuations in the scientific
productivity or its evaluation. We explored numerically the performance of the gradient and average rate
schemes on real data and compared it with the usual way funding agencies deal with theoretical project
proposals.
One of the flaws of the proposed framework for research funding is that, like most others, it may
discourage theorists from conducting creative or very original research. Indeed, it is a well-documented
fact that creative and unusual ideas usually take time to be accepted by experts [22]. A creative grant
applicant may thus receive a poor evaluation on his/her recent research, thus depriving him/her from a
well-deserved funding. A reasonable policy to address this matter, proposed in [37], would be to move
researchers with a very high variance in their expert evaluations to an entirely different funding program,
perhaps relying on random grant schemes, see [39].
Most worryingly, our models of scientific productivity are plagued with ad hoc assumptions. In order
to propose a realistic grant scheme, we need basic information regarding the regular practice of research,
information that can only be acquired through experiment. How do productivity functions look like?
How are they distributed among theoretical researchers? What is the volatility of expert referee scores?
The answers to the questions will teach us whether the research policies presented here work better when
applied at the level of individual groups or whole research institutes.
In any case, the purpose of this article is not to provide funding bodies with the ultimate grant scheme,
but to contribute to the ongoing academic discussion on the problem of research funding. This problem
won’t be solved by university administrators or politicians. The solution, if it exists, will be reached
through the scientific method. Because whenever science comes in, reason and truth follow.
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Appendix A: Computation of g?(X) for geometric productivity functions
Let gi(x) be of the form (6). Then the derivative of gi(x) diverges at x = 0. This implies that the solution
of {x?i }i of problem (5) satisfies x?i > 0 for all i. Under these conditions, {x?i }i can be determined by
demanding that any infinitesimal transfer of funds between players i and j x?i → x˜i = x?i + δ, x?j → x˜j =
x?j − δ should not increase the value of the objective function ∑Ni=1 gi(x˜i). This implies that gi(x?i + δ)−
gi(x?i ) + gj(x
?
j − δ)− gj(x?i ) ≈ δ(
dgi(x?i )
d xi −
dgj(x?j )
d xj) ≤ 0 independently of the sign of δ. This can only be
true if, for some µ > 0,
dgi(x?i )
dxi
=
1
µ
, (A1)
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for i = 1, ..., N. See also a detailed discussion of these conditions in Appendix D 1.
It follows that x?i = (αi Aiµ)
1
1−αi . The condition ∑i xi = X is thus translated to
∑
i
(αi Aiµ)
1
1−αi = X. (A2)
Given a value of X, solving the above equation we can determine the value of µ, whose explicit de-
pendence with X we will express by µ(X). Once µ(X) is known, the final total productivity is given
by:
g?(X) =∑
i
Ai(αi Aiµ(X))
αi
1−αi . (A3)
Appendix B: Proof of Theorem 1
We will first prove the theorem for free funding conditions and functions gi(x) such that fi(x) =
gi(x)
x is
invertible and ranges in (0,∞).
Note that for any configuration x˜ satisfying ∑i x˜i = X, the quantity 1/λ in eq. (12) must belong to the
interval [mini fi(x˜i), maxi fi(x˜i)]. In fact, if x] is the optimal configuration, i.e., the one satisfying fi(x
]
i ) =
1
λ
for all i, for any other configuration x˜ 6= x], one would have at least two indices i and j, such that x˜i > x]i
and x˜j < x
]
j , since ∑i x˜i = ∑i x
]
i = X. Then fi(x˜i) < fi(x
]
i ) =
1
λ and f j(x˜j) > f j(x
]
j ) =
1
λ .
On the other hand, ∑i gi(x
]
i ) = ∑i x
]
i fi(x
]
i ) =
∑i x
]
i
λ =
X
λ . It follows that
g](X) =∑
i
gi(x
]
i ) ∈ X
[
min
i
fi(x˜i), max
i
fi(x˜i)
]
. (B1)
Equation (B1) implies that the statement of Theorem 1 holds iff, for any feasible distribution of funds
{xi}, there exists another feasible distribution of funds {x¯i}i such that
fi(x¯i) ≥ 12
∑j xj f j(xj)
X
=:
f¯
2
. (B2)
Let us see why. If Theorem 1 is true, then
g](X) = X fi(x
]
i ) ≥
1
2
g?(X) ≥ 1
2∑j
xj f j(xj), (B3)
for i = 1, ..., N, and for all feasible {xj}j. Dividing by X and identifying x¯ with x], we arrive at Equation
(B2).
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Conversely, if eq. (B2) holds for x = x?, then by eq. (B1) we have that
g](X) ≥ X min
i
fi(x¯i) ≥ 12∑j
x?j f j(x
?
j ) =
g?(X)
2
. (B4)
Assuming that { fi}i are invertible (and decreasing), we have that equation (B2) is equivalent to:
x¯i ≤ f−1i
(
f¯
2
)
. (B5)
Summing on i and taking into account the normalization constraint we arrive at
X ≤∑
i
f−1i
(
f¯
2
)
. (B6)
Conversely, if the above condition is satisfied, then one can define
x¯i = X
f−1i
(
f¯
2
)
∑l f
−1
l
(
f¯
2
) . (B7)
Then one can verify that {x¯i} satisfy (B5) and the normalization constraint. Eq. (B6) is hence a reformula-
tion of teh statement of Theorem 1.
Let us rewrite eq. (B6) as
2
X f¯ ∑i
xi fi(xi)Fi
(
xi,
f¯
2
)
≥ 1, (B8)
where Fi(x, y) =
y f−1i (y)
gi(x)
. Define pi ≡ xiX , p˜i ≡ pi fi(xi)f¯ , and note that both {pi}i and { p˜i}i are normalized
probability distributions on the variable i = 1, ..., N.
Now, it can be seen that there exists a non-negative number f0 such that
∑
i: fi(xi)≥ f0
p˜i, ∑
i: fi(xi)≤ f0
p˜i ≥ 12 . (B9)
Observe that the second equation implies that
f¯
2
≤ ∑
i: fi(xi)≤ f0
pi fi(xi) ≤ f0. (B10)
Putting all together, we have that
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1
X ∑i
f−1i
(
f¯
2
)
= 2∑
i
p˜iFi
(
xi,
f¯
2
)
≥
2 ∑
i: fi(xi)≥ f0
p˜iFi
(
xi,
f¯
2
)
≥
2
 ∑
i: fi(xi)≥ f0
p˜i
(min
i
{
Fi
(
xi,
f¯
2
)
: fi(xi) ≥ f¯2
})
≥
min
i
{
Fi
(
xi,
f¯
2
)
: fi(xi) ≥ f¯2
}
, (B11)
where the last inequality follows from eq. (B9).
In Appendix C, we prove that, under the assumption that gi(x) admits a second derivative, Fi(x, y) is
a decreasing function of y. This means that, for fi(xi) ≥ f¯2 , Fi
(
xi,
f¯
2
)
≥ Fi(xi, fi(xi)) = 1. This concludes
the proof for free funding conditions and productivity functions such that fi(x) is invertible and ranges in
(0,∞).
Now, suppose that fi(x) is not invertible, or doesn’t range from (0,∞), and suppose also that X+i < ∞.
Then, for any δ > 0, we can always find a new concave, increasing function g˜i(x), with g˜i(0) = 0, and such
that
1. f˜i(x) satisfies the conditions of invertibility and range.
2. g˜′i(x) = 0, for x ≥ X+i .
3. |gi(x)− g˜i(x)| ≤ δ for x ∈ [0, X+i ].
Indeed, it suffices to consider the function g˜i(x) = gi(x) + δ, for x ∈ [xˆ, xˇ], with 0 < xˆ < xˇ <
g−1i (gi(X
+
i )− δ). For x ∈ [0, xˆ] ∪ [xˇ, X+i ], once can find a concave, increasing extension g˜i(x) of gi(x) + δ
such that g˜i(x) has an infinite slope at x = 0 and conditions 2,3 above are satisfied. The reader may have a
look at Fig 5 to understand why this is always the case.
Now consider the optimization problem (5) over the productivity functions {g˜i(x)}i, under free funding
conditions. Since the slope of g˜i is zero from x = X+i onwards, this implies that the optimal solution {x˜?i }i
will satisfy x˜i? ≤ X+i for all i. It therefore coincides with the solution of (5) for capped funding conditions.
Since we can choose δ > 0 at will, we can do so such that ∑i g˜i(x˜?i ) ≈ g?(X), where g?(X) denotes the
optimal solution of the capped problem.
Let {x˜i}i be the solution of problem (10) for the functions {g˜i}i, assuming free funding conditions. We
know, by the previous proof, that
∑
i
g˜i(x˜i) ≥ 12∑i
g˜i(x˜?i ) ≈
1
2
g?(X). (B12)
However, in general x˜i 6≤ X+i . Now, define x˜′i = min(x˜i, X+i ). Then it is evident that ∑i x˜′i ≤ ∑i x˜i and
∑i g˜i(x˜′i) = ∑i g˜i(x˜i). The solution {x˜]i }i of the capped problem with the productivity functions g˜i will be
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FIG. 5. Cosmetic surgery. We modify gi(x) + δ from xˆ to 0 such that the new function g˜i(x) has an infinite slope at
x = 0. Similarly, we modify gi(x) + δ from xˇ onwards so that the slope of g˜i(x) is zero from X+i onwards.
the result of distributing the excess funds ∑i x˜
]
i − x˜′i over the players i such that x˜i < X+i . The result can
just increase the total productivity, and hence we have that
∑
i
g˜i(x˜
]
i ) &
1
2
g?(X). (B13)
Finally, it is easy to see that, by decreasing δ, the total productivity of the optimizer of (10) can be made
arbitrarily close to the left hand side of the above equation. It follows that g](X) ≥ 12 g?(X) in the general
case.
Appendix C: Fi(x, y) is a decreasing function of y
One can easily check that
dFi(x, y)
dy
=
f−1i (y) +
y
f ′i ( f−1(y))
gi(x)
. (C1)
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Call z = f−1i (y). Then, written in terms of gi(x), the numerator of the above equation is proportional to
z
(
1− gi(z)gi(z)−xg′i(z)
)
. Now, by eq. (2), gi(z)− zg′i(z) is non-negative. Since gi(z) is also non-negative, it hence
follows that gi(z)gi(z)−zg′i(z)
≥ 1, and so dF(x,y)dy ≤ 0, i.e., Fi(x, y) is decreasing on y.
Appendix D: Convergence for zero-order method
1. Conditions on the functions gi
In this section, we will discuss under which conditions the zero-order method will converge to the
optimal solution. To simplify the notation, in the following we will assume that the total budget X is
normalized, i.e., X = 1. This physically corresponds to a change of unit for measuring the budget, so it
will not affect the solution. From a mathematical perspective, the same arguments hold for the general
case of X 6= 1. We will not consider the case of capped funds.
Our assumptions on the single productivity functions {gi}i are as follows:
• domgi = [0, 1],
• gi(0) = 0,
• g′i > 0, monotonicity (exclude flat case, for uniqueness of solutions)
• g′′i < 0 concavity (exclude linear case).
By concavity, it follows that
g(x1) + (x2 − x1)g′(x1) > g(x2), for x2 > x1 (D1)
which, together with g(0) = 0 implies
g(x)− xg′(x) > 0⇒ g(x)
x
> g′(x), for x > 0. (D2)
The problem in Eq. (10), then, becomes
maximize
N
∑
i=1
Gi(x)i,
such that
N
∑
i=1
xi = 1,
xj ≥ 0, j = 1, ..., N. (D3)
It is convenient to define the functions fi(x) := gi(x)/x, for all i. We can now derive the conditions for the
functions fi such that the optimal solution x] for the problem (D3) satisfies
G′i(x
]
i ) =
gi(x])
x]
= fi(x]) =
1
λ
, for all i. (D4)
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A necessary condition for a point x] to be optimal is given by the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions
[40]. Moreover, since the problem is concave, with linear inequality constraints and an interior feasible
point, by Slater’s condition [40], the KKT conditions are also sufficient. We can write KKT conditions for
the optimal point x].
− gi(x
]
i )
x]i
− µi − ν = 0,
N
∑
i=1
x]i = 1,
x]i ≥ 0, for i = 1, . . . , N
µi ≥ 0, for i = 1, . . . , N
µix
]
i = 0, for i = 1, . . . , N.
(D5)
The last two conditions imply that when x]i > 0, then µi = 0. We want to find conditions on
gi(x
]
i )
x]i
= fi(x
]
i ),
such that there is no solution of Eq. (D5) with x]i = 0. In this case, we can identify ν =
1
λ and obtain the
condition in Eq. (D4).
For example, one could ask that limx→0
gi(x)
x = g
′
i(0) = fi(0) = ∞, for all i. In fact, let us assume that
f1(0) = ∞ and x
]
1 = 0, then to satisfy ∑
n
i=1 x
]
i = 1, at least another x
]
i , say x
]
2 must be strictly greater
than zero. But then µ2 = 0 and the condition f2(x
]
2) = f1(x
]
1) + µ1 cannot be satisfied for µ1 ≥ 0. More
generally, one could simply ask that fi in zero is “big enough” with respect to the other functions f j, j 6= i.
A sufficient condition to exclude the case x]i = 0 for some i is given by
fi(0) > f j
(
1
N − 1
)
, for all i, j 6= i. (D6)
This correspond to the configuration in which we assign 0 to i and an equal amount to j 6= i, i.e., x]i = 0
and x]j =
1
N−1 for j 6= i. If fi(0) is too big, then Eq. (D5) cannot be satisfied. In order to increase the value
of some f j we would have to decrease x
]
j , however, given the condition ∑
N
i=1 x
]
i = 1, some other x
]
j′ should
be increased, consequently decreasing the value of f j′ .
Finally, let us comment on the assumptions on our productivity such as Eq. (D6). First, notice that such
conditions involve only the local behavior of the function around x = 0. As a consequence, given any
“actual” productivity function g, we can modify it in a neighborhood of x = 0 to obtain g˜ such that, e.g.,
g˜′(0) = ∞ but g˜(x) = g(x) for all x > ε, for some ε > 0. Applying the iterative method to gi or g˜i for each
iterative step k such that xki > ε will give the same results. Since ε can be chosen arbitrary small, we can
always chose a value such that the values xi ≤ ε correspond, as a fraction of the total budget X, to, e.g.,
10−3 euros. This implies that the difference between gi and g˜i will be relevant only at the step k where we
have to redistribute funds of the order of 10−3 euros. Thus, in practical applications, the assumption on
the behavior of g in a neighborhood of x = 0 implies no loss of generality.
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2. Proof of convergence
We have seen in the previous section that, under condition (D6), the optimal solution x] for the prob-
lem (D3) satisfies
fi(x]) =
1
λ
, for all i. (D7)
Now, notice that f ′i (x) = [xg
′
i(x)− gi(x)]/x2 < 0, due to Eq. (D2), hence f is monotone and the solution
of Eq. (D7) is unique. In fact, if there were two solutions x and x˜, then 1/λ = fi(xi) = fi(x˜i) ⇒ xi =
f−1i fi(x˜i) = x˜i for all i.
Moreover, we have seen in Appendix B that for any normalized budget distribution x˜i, we have
1
λ
∈ [min
i
fi(x˜i), max
i
fi(x˜i)]. (D8)
Given the total productivity P(x) = ∑i gi(xi), the iterative method is defined as
xki → xk+1i =
gi(xki )
P(xk)
, (D9)
with initial point x0 such that x0i > 0 for all i.
To show that the method converges to x], we will show that for any initial point x0, with x0i > 0 for all i
and x0 6= x] the sequences of intervals Ik := [mini fi(xki ), maxi fi(xki )] satisfies
Ik+1 $ Ik, and |Ik| → 0 for k→ ∞, (D10)
where for I = [a, b] we define |I| := b− a.
By substituting gi(xi) = xi fi(xi) in the definition of Eq. (D9), we have
fi(xki )
P(xk)
> 1⇒ xk+1i > xki ;
fi(xki )
P(xk)
< 1⇒ xk+1i < xki ;
fi(xki )
P(xk)
= 1⇒ xk+1i = xki ;
(D11)
which implies, by the strict monotonicity of fi that
fi(xki )
P(xk)
> 1⇒ fi(xk+1i ) < fi(xki );
fi(xki )
P(xk)
< 1⇒ fi(xk+1i ) > fi(xki );
fi(xki )
P(xk)
= 1⇒ fi(xk+1i ) = fi(xki );
(D12)
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Moreover, by the definition of P(xk) and ∑i xi = 1, we have
min
i
fi(xki ) ≤ P(xk) =∑
i
xki fi(x
k
i ) ≤ maxi fi(x
k
i ). (D13)
Next we want to prove a condition on the increase (and decrease) for fi in the iteration, namely
fi(xki )
P(xk)
> 1⇒ fi(xk+1i ) > P(xk);
fi(xki )
P(xk)
< 1⇒ fi(xk+1i ) < P(xk).
(D14)
Let us consider first the case 0 < α < 1 with α := fi(xki )/P(x
k) = xk+1i /x
k
i . We have
fi(xk+1i ) < P(x
k)⇔ fi(αxki ) <
fi(xki )
α
⇔ α fi(αx
k
i )
fi(xki )
< 1. (D15)
It is sufficient, then, to notice that
α fi(αx)
fi(x)
= α
gi(αx)
αx
x
gi(x)
=
gi(αx)
gi(x)
< 1, (D16)
since gi(x) is monotonically increasing in [0, 1] (g′i > 0), 0 < α < 1 and x
0
i > 0. Analogously, one can prove
that in the case α > 1,
gi(αx)
gi(x)
> 1⇒ fi(xk+1i ) > P(xk). (D17)
It remains to be proven that limk→∞ |Ik| = 0. We will argue by contradiction. Let us assume that
limk→∞ Ik = [a, b], with b− a > 0. Since {xk}k is bounded, there exist a converging subsequence {xkn}n
with limit xkn → x∗, with mini fi(x∗i ) = a and maxi fi(x∗i ) = b. However, since b− a > 0, at least one of the
following must be true: either P(x∗) 6= a or P(x∗) 6= b. Let us assume that P(x∗) 6= a, as the other case is
identical. Then, by applying the iterative map, we obtain a new interval I′ = [a′, b] ( [a, b], in contradiction
with the assumption that [a, b] was the limit. 
3. Speed of convergence
In the following, we will show that the iterative method converges exponentially. First, we need to prove
that there exists β < 1 such that sequence {xk}k obtained via the iterative method of Eq. (D9) satisfies
| fi(xk+1i )− P(xk)| ≤ β| fi(xki )− P(xk)|, ∀, i, k. (D18)
Let us define γ := P(xk)−1. We can rewrite the iterative step as xk+1i = gi(x
k
i )γ and fi(x
k
i )/P(x
k) =
γgi(xki )/x
k
i . Let us first assume fi(x
k
i )/P(x
k) = 1 + ε with ε > 0, we will treat the other case below. We
then have
fi(xk+1i )− P(xk)
fi(xki )− P(xk)
=
fi(x
k+1
i )
P(xk) − 1
fi(xki )
P(xk) − 1
=
gi(gi(xki )γ)γ
γgi(xki )
− 1
gi(xki )γ
xki
− 1
=
gi(gi(xki )γ)
gi(xki )
− 1
gi(xki )γ
xki
− 1
. (D19)
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Let us simplify the expression, using also γgi(xki ) = (1+ ε)x
k
i , the expression (D19) becomes
gi(xki (1+ ε))− gi(xki )
εgi(xki )
<
εxki g
′
i(x
k
i )
εgi(xki )
=
xig′i(x
k
i )
gi(xki )
≤ βi < 1, (D20)
where we used Eqs. (D1),(D2), respectively, for the two inequalities, and defined βi = maxx∈[0,1]
xg′i(x)
gi(x)
.
Notice that such a maximum exists since xg
′
i(x)
gi(x)
is a continuous function, as it is continuous in 0, and [0, 1]
is a closed and bounded interval.
The case fi(xki )/P(x
k) = 1− ε with ε > 0 is slightly more complicated. Repeating the initial steps, we
obtain
P(xk)− f (xk+1i
P(xk)− f (xki
=
gi(xki )− gi(xki (1− ε))
εgi(xki )
<
xki g
′
i((1− ε)xki )
g(xki )
, (D21)
again using Eq. (D1). Now, let us drop the indices i, k to make the notation lighter and define
Hx(ε) :=
g(x)− g(x(1− ε))
εg(x)
, H1x(ε) :=
xg′((1− ε)x)
g(x)
. (D22)
Eq. (D21) becomes Hx(ε) < H1x(ε). We can then verify that the derivative w.r.t. ε is strictly positive, i.e.,
H′x(ε) =
1
ε2g(x)
[−g(x) + g((1− ε)x) + εxg′((1− ε)x)] > 0, (D23)
again using Eq. (D1), (compare also to Eq. (D21)). As a consequence, Hx is monotonically increasing.
Notice that this implies that Hx is continuous in 0 since it is positive and limε→0 Hx(ε) ≤ limε→0 H1x(ε) =
xg′(x)/g(x) < 1. Its maximal value for ε ∈ [0, 1] is given by Hx(1) = 1. However, such a value of ε cannot
be reached, since by assumption
1− ε = fi(x
k
i )
P(xk)
≥ a0
b0
⇒ ε ≤ 1− a0
b0
, (D24)
where a0, b0 are the endpoints of the interval I0 = [a0, b0] = [mini fi(x0i ), maxi fi(x
0
i )], computed by evalu-
ating all { fi}i on the first iteration point x0, with x0i > 0 for all i.
We then obtain, for the case 1− ε, βi := max(x,ε)∈[0,1]×[0,1−a0/b0] Hx(ε). Since, for x ≥ 0, Hx(ε) is strictly
increasing in ε and equals 1 at ε = 1, it follows that βi < 1. Finally, β appearing in Eq. (D18) can be
obtained as β := maxi βi.
To complete the proof of exponential speed, we will first show that for each iterative step k, and each
pair of indices i, j such that fi(xki )− P(xk) > 0 and f j(xkj )− P(xk) < 0,
| fi(xk+1i )− f j(xk+1j )| ≤ β| fi(xki )− f j(xkj )|. (D25)
In fact, fi(xki )− P(xk) > 0⇒ fi(xk+1i )− P(xk) > 0 and f j(xkj )− P(xk) < 0⇒ f j(xk+1j )− P(xk) < 0, hence,
we can write
| fi(xk+1i )− f j(xk+1j )| = | fi(xk+1i )− P(xk)|+ |P(xk)− f j(xk+1j )|
≤ β(| fi(xk+1i )− P(xk)|+ |P(xk)− f j(xk+1j )|)
= β( fi(xk+1i )− P(xk) + P(xk)− f j(xk+1j )) = β| fi(xk+1i )− f j(xk+1j )|. (D26)
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Finally, denoting by m the index associated with the minimum at the step k + 1 i.e., fm(xk+1m ) =
mini fi(xk+1i ) and M the index associated with the maximum, i.e., fM(x
kk+1
M ) = maxi fi(x
k+1
i ), we can
write.
|Ik+1| = | fM(xk+1M )− fm(xk+1m )| ≤ β| fM(xkM)− fm(xkm)|
≤ β|max
i
fi(xki )−minj f j(x
k
j )| = β|Ik|, (D27)
which completes the proof of exponential convergence. 
Appendix E: Proof of convergence of the gradient scheme for deterministic productivity functions
In this Appendix, we will prove that funding policy (17), under deterministic, time-independent produc-
tivity functions, generates an orbit over the space of budget distributions that stays for most of the time
near the optimal productivity. That is, it satisfies eq. (15).
To do so, we will follow the lines of [33]. We will assume that |g′′i (x)| ≤ Γ for x ∈ [X−i , X+i ]; that the
diameter of the set B of valid budget distributions is D; and that ‖∇¯g(x¯)‖ ≤ G, for x¯ ∈ B.
First, by contractivity of projections, we have that
‖x¯k+1 − x¯k‖ ≤ ‖z¯k+1 − x¯k‖ = e‖∇˜kg‖. (E1)
Now, (∇˜kg)i = gi(x
k
i )−gi(xk−1i )
xki−xk−1i
= g′i(x
k
i ) +
Gki
2 (x
k−1
i − xki ), where Gki ≡ g′′i (x), for some x ∈ [xki , xk+1i ]. It
follows that ∇˜kg(x¯k) = ∇¯kg + 12Γk(x¯k−1i − x¯ki ), where Γk is a diagonal matrix whose (negative) entries are
lower bounded by −Γ. This implies, by eq. (E1), that
‖x¯k+1 − x¯k‖ ≤ e
(
G + Γ‖x¯k − x¯k−1‖
)
≤ e
(
G +
1
2
ΓD
)
. (E2)
Now, let x¯∗ be the budget distribution that maximizes the total scientific productivity. Again, by con-
tractivity of projections, we have that
‖x¯k+1 − x¯∗‖2 ≤ ‖z¯k+1 − x¯∗‖2 ≤ ‖x¯k − x¯∗‖2 + e2‖∇˜kg(x¯)‖2 + 2e∇˜kg · (x¯k − x¯∗) ≤
‖x¯k − x¯∗‖2 + e2
(
G +
1
2
ΓD
)2
+ 2e∇kg · (x¯k − x¯∗) + eΓ‖x¯k − x¯k−1‖‖x¯k − x¯?‖ ≤
‖x¯k − x¯∗‖2 + e2
(
G +
1
2
ΓD
)(
G +
3
2
ΓD
)
+ 2e∇kg · (x¯k − x¯∗). (E3)
By induction, we arrive at
‖x¯k+1 − x¯∗‖2 ≤ ‖x¯1 − x¯∗‖2 + e2k
(
G +
1
2
ΓD
)(
G +
3
2
ΓD
)
+ 2
k
∑
j=1
e∇¯g · (x¯k − x¯∗). (E4)
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Invoking the inequalities ‖x¯k+1 − x¯∗‖2 ≥ 0, ‖x¯1 − x¯∗‖2 ≤ D2 and putting all this together, we have that
1
k
k
∑
j=1
∇¯g · (x¯∗ − x¯j) ≤ 1
2ek
(
D2 + e2k
(
G +
1
2
ΓD
)(
G +
3
2
ΓD
))
. (E5)
By concavity of g, we have that ∇¯kg · (x¯∗ − x¯k) ≥ g(x¯∗)− g(x¯k) ≥ 0. Putting all together, we arrive at
1
k
k
∑
j=1
g(x¯∗)− g(x¯j) ≤ 1
2ek
(
D2 + e2k
(
G +
1
2
ΓD
)(
G +
3
2
ΓD
))
. (E6)
In the limit k→ ∞, the right hand side of the equation above can be approximated as e2
(
G + 12ΓD
) (
G + 32ΓD
)
,
i.e., it can be made arbitrarily small by decreasing the learning rate e.
Appendix F: Convergence of the average rates scheme A for time-dependent, non-deterministic productivity
functions
The proof follows the same steps as the convergence of the stochastic subgradient method, see [41]. It is
also very similar to the proof in Appendix E. Call yk the feasible budget maximizing 〈G(x¯, k)〉, and suppose
that ‖yk − yk+1‖ ≤ δ. Call (xj)j the sequence of budgets produced by the average rates scheme A. We will
prove that, for high k and suitably chosen learning rate e, with probability 1−O
(
δ1/4
θ
)
, 1k ∑j=1 |g(x¯j, j)−
g(yj, j)| ≤ θ.
By Taylor’s theorem, we have that G(x, k) = G(yk, k) + ∇¯G(yk, k) · (x − yk) + 12 (x − yk)T · H · (x − yk),
where H is the Hessian of G(x, k) evaluated at a point c within the set {px¯+ (1− p)yk}. Such is a diagonal
matrix with diagonal elements of value
g′i(ci)−
gi(ci)
ci
ci
. By eq. (2), we have that each of them is negative.
We will assume that, for i = 1, ..., N, there exists a number h > 0 such that 12
∣∣∣∣ g′i(x)− gi(x)xx ∣∣∣∣ ≥ h for all
x ∈ [X−i , X+i ]. This can be seen equivalent as taking gi(x) to be curved at the origin. On the other hand,
since yk is a maximum, we have that 0 ≥ dG(tx+(1−t)yk ,k)dt |t=0 = ∇¯G(yk, k) · (x− yk). This allows us to write
G(yk, k)− G(x, k) ≥ h‖yk − x‖2. (F1)
We will use this relation soon.
Similarly, we will assume that there exists γ > 0 such that γ|g(x, k)− g(y, k)| ≤ ‖x− y‖ for all feasible
x, y. Calling ∇¯kG the random vector ( gk1
xk1
, g
k
2
xk2
, ...), we will also assume that ‖∇¯kG‖ ≤ Γ. Of course, by
assumption 〈∇¯kG〉 = ∇¯〈G(x, k)〉. We will denote by R the radius of the feasible region of budgets.
Now, fix the values of {gj : j = 1, ..., k− 1}. Following Appendix E, we have that
‖xk+1 − yk+1‖ ≤ ‖xk − yk+1‖2 + 2e∇¯kG · (xk − yk+1) + e2‖∇¯kG‖2. (F2)
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In turn, ‖xk − yk+1‖ ≤ ‖xk − yk‖+ ‖yk − yk+1‖ ≤ ‖xk − yk‖+ δ. It follows that ‖xk − yk+1‖2 ≤ ‖xk −
yk‖2 + δ2 + 2Rδ. Also, ‖∇¯kG‖2 ≤ Γ. Putting all together, we have that
‖xk+1 − yk+1‖2 ≤ ‖xk − yk‖2 + 2e∇¯kG · (xk − yk) + e2Γ2 + 2eΓδ+ δ2 + 2Rδ =
‖xk − yk‖2 + 2e∇¯kG · (xk − yk) + r(δ, e), (F3)
with r(δ, e) = 2Γeδ+ δ2 + 2Rδ+ Γ2e2.
Taking an average over the possible values of gk, we have that
〈‖xk+1 − yk+1‖2〉g1,...,gk−1 ≤ ‖xk − yk‖2 + 2e∇¯G · (xk − yk) + r(δ, e)
≤ ‖xk − yk‖2 + 2e(G(xk, k)− G(yk, k)) + r(δ, e). (F4)
Now we can fix {xj : j = 1, ..., k− 1} and use the same idea to get rid of the term ‖xk − yk‖2. Iterating,
we have that
0 ≤ 〈‖x0 − y0‖2〉 ≤ R2 + 2e
〈
k
∑
j=1
(G(xj, j)− G(yj, j))
〉
+ kr(δ, e). (F5)
Rearranging, we have that
1
k
〈
k
∑
j=1
(G(yj, j)− G(xj, j))
〉
≤ r(δ, e)
2e
+
R2
2ek
. (F6)
Taking the limit k→ ∞, we have that the right hand side is bounded by r(δ,e)e . On the other hand, it can
be verified that the value of e that minimizes r(δ,e)e is e
? = (
√
δ
√
δ+ 2R)/Γ, in which case we have that
lim
k→∞
1
k
〈
k
∑
j=1
(G(yj, j)− G(xj, j))
〉
≤ O(
√
δ). (F7)
By (F1), G(yj, j)− G(xj, j) can be lower bounded by h‖yj − xj‖2, and, in turn, the term ‖yj − xj‖ can be
lowerbounded by γ|g(yj, j)− g(xj, j)|. Putting all together, we have that
(
lim
k→∞
1
k
〈
k
∑
j=1
g(yj, j)− g(xj, j)
〉)2
≤
(
lim
k→∞
1
k
〈
k
∑
j=1
|g(yj, j)− g(xj, j)|
〉)2
≤
lim
k→∞
1
k
〈
k
∑
j=1
|g(yj, j)− g(xj, j)|2
〉
≤ O(
√
δ). (F8)
Using the relation P(Z ≥ θ) ≤ 〈Z〉θ , valid for any non-negative random variable Z, we conclude that
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P
(∣∣∣∣∣ limk→∞ 1k k∑j=1 g(yj, j)− g(xj, j)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ θ
)
≤ (F9)
P
(
lim
k→∞
1
k
k
∑
j=1
|g(yj, j)− g(xj, j)| ≥ θ
)
≤ O
(
δ1/4
θ
)
. (F10)
Appendix G: Security of the rule of three
In Section VII, we considered the possibility that Daniel, a member of a large scientific community subject
to the rule of three, could win more funds by suitably choosing when to report his research achievements.
The purpose of this Appendix is to prove that, in the long run, Daniel cannot expect to obtain more funds
than by acting honestly.
Following Table II, in the (k− 1)th call, Daniel’s undeclared scientific output equals g+i +∑k−1j=0 gi(x
j
i)− g
j
i .
Multiplying by λ, invoking the identity xj+1i = λg
j
i and taking into account that undeclared scientific
outputs are non-negative, we have that
k
∑
j=0
xji ≤ x0i + λg+i +
k−1
∑
j=0
λgi(x
j
i) ≤ x0i + λg+i + kλgi
∑k−1j=0 xji
k
 , (G1)
where the last inequality follows from the concavity of gi.
Define sk via the relation 1k ∑
k−1
j=0 x
j
i = x
]
i + s
k, for k > 0, and x0i + λg
0 = x]i + s
0. Then, the above equation
implies
x]i + sk+1 ≤
1
k + 1
(x]i + s
0) +
k
k + 1
λgi
(
x]i + s
k−1
)
. (G2)
Now, λgi(x
]
i + s) ≤ λgi(x]i ) + λg′i(x]i )s = x]i + λg′i(x]i )s. In turn, by eq. (2), we have that λg′i(x]i ) <
λgi(x
]
i )/x
]
i = 1. Here we have assumed that x
]
i > 0 and that gi is curved at the origin. Putting all together,
we have that
λgi(x
]
i + s) ≤ x]i + αis, (G3)
with αi ≡ λg′i(x]i ) < 1.
Applying this relation to the right-hand side of (G2) and rearranging, we end up with
sk+1 ≤ 1
k + 1
s0 +
k
k + 1
αisk. (G4)
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Since αi < 1, it follows, from the above formula, that the sequence (sk)k can neither keep growing
indefinitely nor converge to a value greater than 0. This finishes the argument.
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